£ Research Article: a completed research article drawing on one or more CISR research projects that presents management frameworks, findings and recommendations. Abstract: Delta Air Lines entered e-business with much aplomb when it agreed to provide Priceline.com with its excess inventory (seats on planes) in exchange for a 10% equity position. When Priceline stock soared, Delta sold part of its holding for $750 million. Delta management recognized that e-business offered many different business opportunities and has identified ways to lower costs (e.g. selling tickets on line), increase revenues (e.g. selling excess inventory through Priceline), and experiment with new business concepts (developing MYOBTravel.com for small and medium-sized businesses). This case stud y describes Delta's e-business initiatives, noting the organizational structure used to aggressively pursue new opportunities. Of particular note is the role of the IT transformation that positioned Delta for the opportunities e-business created. Seeking to avert a Y2K crisis, Delta invested $1 billion in its IT infrastructure and developed a publish-and-subscribe environment to support a cross-functional customerorientation.
E-business is in many respects the answer to our prayers with respect to success in the future. We are an older economy business, and we have a cost structure as a transportation company that isn't envied by very many people. We really have to think about entirely new ways of doing things. I think that the arrival of e-commerce at this time has been a godsend.
Over the years Delta had accumulated a number of what management referred to as "hidden assets"-assets that did not appear on the balance sheet-such as brand recognition, a large customer base, and purchasing power. Delta expected its e-business initiatives to support its core business by driving value from its hidden assets. In addition, Leo Mullin believed that information technology in general, and the Internet in particular, offered opportunities to lower distribution costs, increase employee productivity, and improve customer service.
Background
In 2000, Delta Air Lines was the United States' third largest airline in terms of revenues and passenger miles, and the largest U.S. airline in terms of number of departures and passengers enplaned. Revenues in 2000 neared $16 billion, and Delta reported net income of over $1 billion for the second consecutive year. (See Exhibit 1 for Summary Financial Statements.) Based in Atlanta, Georgia, the firm had 84,000 employees, who each year flew 117 million customers to 45 states within the U.S. and 44 cities in 28 countries throughout the world. With its Sky Team 1 alliance partners, Delta's network covered 118 cities in 47 countries.
When Leo Mullin became CEO in 1997, Delta rated last on all three of the key customer metrics in the airline industry: on-time arrivals, customer complaints to the DOT, and baggage handling statistics. The organization was demoralized, and analysts regarded Delta as a laggard internationally. In addition, Delta's information technology, which had been outsourced several years earlier, was seriously outdated and facing a Y2K crisis. Three years la ter Delta was the only airline to score in the top three on all three customer metrics, employee surveys indicated that morale at Delta ranked in the top quartile among US companies, and Delta belonged to what was generally considered to be the second best international airline alliance. Delta had rebuilt its information technology infrastructure and was gaining recognition as a high-technology firm. Its information technology subsidiary, Delta Technology, won the Computerworld Smithsonian Award for Technology Innovation in 2000. In July 2000, Leo Mullin was named by Forbes magazine as a member of "The E-Gang," twelve executives who were "forcing the web to grow up." 2 Delta had actually been "lured" into e-business by Priceline, a dot-com start-up whose value proposition was that it would sell airlines' excess inventory (seats on flights) at discounted prices to persons for whom price would determine whether or not they would fly (www.priceline.com). Delta marketing executives were initially skeptical of the idea of selling tickets through Priceline, but the chief financial officer supported the concept and Leo Mullin was persuaded of the inevitability of the Priceline model as a distribution channel. As the first major airline to agree to sell tickets through Priceline, Delta received a 10% equity stake. When Priceline stock later soared, Delta cashed in part of its equity holding and banked more than $750 million: The Priceline alliance (a reverse auction) sold tickets to customers for whom price was the major determinant guiding their travel choices. Delta sold $250 million in tickets through Priceline in 2000.
For customers who typically compared schedules and prices across airlines, Delta joined with four other airlines to create Orbitz, 3 an online travel service intended to compete with Travelocity (www.travelocity.com) and Expedia (www.expedia.com)-two early, successful entrants into the online ticket sales industry. Orbitz promised to show customers all available flights on a given route. Its earliest version merely provided flight information, but in 2001 Orbitz would sell seats on any airline and also offer hotels, rental cars, and other travel services.
In early 2001, Delta planned a roll-out of MYOBtravel.com (mind your own business travel) for companies with five to fifty travelers, a constituency that Delta management believed was under-served. MYOBtravel.com provided expense monitoring and measuring in addition to acting as a portal for airline ticket sales, hotels, and rental cars. Delta would benefit from MYOBtravel.com in a number of ways: commissions on sales of other firms' products, reduced costs on the sale of Delta flights, marketing fees paid by participating firms, and, conceivably, additional sales on Delta flights.
Delta.com, Priceline, Orbitz, and MYOBtravel.com reached out to very different customer segments. Management believed that e-business offered many more opportunities to segment customers and design channels to meet their individual needs: Management noted that whether customers bought their tickets through a Delta site, a travel agent, Priceline, or another online ticket agency, the seats that they bought were clearly branded. Passengers would fly on Delta planes staffed by Delta employees. Leo Mullin wanted to "under-promise and over-deliver" so that every customer was potentially a repeat customer, loyal to the Delta brand.
B2B and B2E Initiatives
Delta's B2C efforts pre-dated those of either B2B or B2E, but the firm felt that significant benefits could accrue from all three initiatives. In the B2B space, Delta was particularly focused on leveraging its spending power and had joined a consortium of 30 airlines working to establish a B2B exchange. Although airlines had formed a variety of codesharing partnerships, and they cooperated on ventures such as Orbitz, the B2B exchange was difficult to negotiate: The e-business team was focused on changing internal processes to enable the firm to respond faster to e-business opportunities. In particular, the team noted that it was important to adopt some of the characteristics of dotcom organizations, such as speed, traction, and risk-taking. The team found that partnerships with start-ups could help to infuse these values into some of their e-business projects. They also found value in selectively using consultants or contractors to offset resource limitations. For example, the MYOBtravel.com initiative was developed with Boston Consulting Group. BCG did the initial work to identify the opportunities for small business travel. Delta then brought in its own internal experts on pricing and revenue management, customer branding, and customer experience-some ad hoc and some dedicated to the initiative-to work with BCG to actually design and build the travel hub.
The e-business team had primary responsibility for launching e-business initiatives, but the expectation was that responsibility for managing and operating ongoing e-business initiatives would be located in appropriate functional areas. Programs like Orbitz and MYOBtravel.com, for example, might remain in the e-business unit for a year or so, but they would eventually be moved into the sales and distribution area. How quickly these programs could be moved into existing functional units would partly determine how quickly the e-business team would disband.
The IT Infrastructure E-business initiatives at Delta leveraged the firm's recently renewed IT infrastructure. Responding to a Y2K crisis and the desire to greatly enhance the "customer experience," the firm had spent hundreds of millions of dollars in 1998-99 to tear out many of its old legacy systems and rebuild its IT infrastructure. The new infrastructure, referred to as the Digital Nervous System, was built around the firm's core processes. The information required for the firm's core processes was captured in nine central databases (location, schedule, flight, maintenance, equipment, employee, aircraft, customer, and ticket) and TIBCO middleware was built around the databases so that new applications could access and, if appropriate, update relevant data. (The Digital Nervous System is depicted in Exhibit 2.)
This structure gave Delta a "publish and subscribe" environment which management felt was critical to ensure that real-time information was made available to everyone with a need to know. As an application updated one of the central databases (i.e., published an event), the information would be shared with any application that had subscribed for that information. DeRodes noted that the Digital Nervous System greatly reduced application development time. The prototype of the application that would send notification to customer pagers and computers was prepared in a couple weeks. Typically, he would have expected eight to nine months of development time. To become fully subscribed, the Digital Nervous System required complete renewal of the computing technology at each of Delta's airports. Delta's 26 busiest airports had been fully equipped with new hardware and networks by the end of 1999; another 26 would be completed by the end of 2000. The remaining 35 airports handled a total of only 7% of Delta's customers, but the publish and subscribe concept could not be fully deployed until those airports were also updated. DeRodes noted that Delta was already spending more money on technology than any other airline but that the spending was unlikely to diminish as he attempted to upgrade the last of the airports, finish building out the Digital Nervous System, and add new customer service and e-business applications:
But Bob DeRodes received far more requests for IT services than he could deliver. He worked with an IT Board, consisting of the chief financial officer, the executive vice president for customer service, the controller, and the heads of flight operations, customer commitment, and distribution planning to determine IT priorities. The e-business team relied on Delta Technology to do the IT development work for e-business initiatives. This ensured that ebusiness initiatives were tied back into the core business and that e-business priorities were established in light of their contribution to the core, but it also meant that e-business initiatives were accessing the same resources that were requested by the functional units for IT support. Thus, as they established IT priorities, the IT Board was assessing the resources that could be made available for ebusiness.
Establishing and Funding e -Business Priorities
To ensure that the e-business team focused on the initiatives believed to have the most significant impact on Delta's profitability and competitiveness, Vince Caminiti applied for funding through the traditional capital budgeting process. He estimated the ROI of projects that appeared most likely to significantly reduce costs, increase revenues, or offer valuable equity positions. He then sent his recommendations to the Information Technology Board, where they would be evaluated relative to other IT projects. Because e-business opportunities arose unexpectedly, Caminiti had 90-day reviews with the IT Board. Delta management felt that the highly dynamic nature of e-business required a more flexible funding process. Thus, an opportunity with a high ROI might be funded mid-year.
Caminiti found that it was not unusual for e-business opportunities to have very high potential ROIs. He indicated that Delta looked to e-business to have a significant impact on the bottom line: 
